INTRODUCTION TO THE COLLECTION Andrea Sauchelli This volume is divided into two parts: the first introduces Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons (henceforth 'R&P'), whereas the second includes chapters that critically discuss recurring ideas in R&P. The chapters in this collection were written by different authors, and their styles and approaches slightly differ from each other. As tlie editor of this volume, I decided against imposing any strict requirements on its contributors, with the exception of reminding the contributors to the first part that their chapters are supposed to help the readers better understand the content of Parfit's book. Some of these writers adopted a more critical style, whereas others chose a more illustrative and exegetical approach. I think that they have all achieved the aim of introducing Parfit's book dearly, albeit in different ways. The chapters in the second part were commissioned with the intent of collecting works in various fields of philosophy that further elaborate on some ofR&P's principal themes and ideas.As will emerge from this brief introduction, the variety of the areas of research discussed in R&P is remarkable. Parfit's book has become a contemporary classic, widely read both by philosophers and scholars in 7cther fields (e.g. psychology and even economics). Parfit made several changes to the first edition of R&P published in 1984-the introduction to the 1987 edition contains a brief summary of these alterations.1 In its 1987 version, R&P comprises four parts and ten appendices. Regarding its content, R&P elaborates on several works that Parfit published from the early 1970s to the beginning of the 1980s. In fact, entire chapters are based on earlier material, albeit modified in light of the criticisms and suggestions Parfit received from an astonishing number of other influential philosophers (the long list includes the likes of Amartya Sen, Shelley Kagan, Larry Temkin, Bernard Williams and John Broome). Among the authors whose published works have more conspicuously influenced R&P, whether directly or indirectly, we may list: Henry Sidgwick, Thomas Nagel, David Wiggins and Bernard Williams. The success and enduring popularity of R&P 2 Andrea Sauchelli . . . hi h tandard of argumentanve ngour, . db *ts*mpress1vely gs . • be Partially explame Y 1 1 dies discussed and the mteresnng may . • of the case stll ' the inventiveness and persp1cac1ty h the book. Furthermore, R&P touches d fi d d throug out and controversial_ theses e e_n arently disparate fields of philosophy-am~ng on a variety of different topics m app . hi personal identity and population . h normative et cs, others, rational choice t eory, . blems and issues that others (with rare ethics-and brings together various pro * ) h discussed only separately. nifyi" exceptions ave . 1 . d , there are recurring themes and u ng th gh R&P 'contams mu tltll es , Al ou . c 1 Parfit's attempt to show that one popular threads that run through it; ior examp e, . , fi . . all th Self-interest theory (S) is false.-To a mt approxuna-vers1on of what he c s e h h . * di *d al rationality tells us that eac person as a supreme tion this theory about m VI u . . ' . * 1 that her life go for her as well as possible. Because rational ultimate aim, name Y, . . there are erent conce 1 difli Pt*ons of how a life can go well, and Parfit arms to provide arguments sufficiently general to apply to several vers~ons of S, ~e pai~stakingly explores the applicability of his arguments to the various ways m which S can be further understood.3 In turn, the recurring criticism of S is developed 'from different fronts'. More specifically, in the first part of R&P, Self-Defeating Theories, Parfit suggests that S, along with consequentialist theories of morality (C), may be indirectly self-defeating and possibly self-effacing. A theory T is directly individually self-defeating when there are cases in which it is certain that, if someone successfully follows T, she will thereby cause her own T-given aims (the aims given to her by the theory itself) to be more poorly achieved than they would have been if she had not successfully followed T. Parfit argues that S is not directly but indirectly self-defeating because there are people for whom it would be worse if they were disposed never to do what they believe would be worse for them. This point does not show that S fails on its own terms because, as a theory of individual rationality, S does not claim th t h * di *d al a eac m VI u should never act irrationally. In fact, Parfit suggests that in certain cases *t b * al . . . . 1 may e ration to act irrationally (there can be cases of rational irrationality) h • f, . -per aps Just or a short time-and this is compatible wnh S. Although not directly If d fi . b h . se e eating, S and C are self-effacing because they may ot imply that we should t b Ii * cIi th ry to e eve m some other theory. For instance imp es at we should believe h h , would be best d *a11 . t e t eory such that, if believed, the outcome -an , cruc1 y this p * • . . (a similar reasoning appli 's) omt IS compatible with not believing C itself es to . In additi d S can be collectively self-d f, . . on, an perhaps even more importantly, e eating. In part1cul *d * • than one individual in whi h* (') h . ar, cons1 er situations involving more c * 1 t e achie f partly depends on what othe d ( .. ) vement O each person's T-given aims h h rs o, u what e h w at t e others do, and (iii) T . . ac person does will not determine diffc . is agent-relative* th . . . erent aims. Parfit claims tha h ' at is, It gives to different agents th t t ere are many * an no-one does what will b b cases m which if each person rather there ill b e etter for herself h c . w e a worse outcome fo ' or er 1amily, or those she loves, n_õ everybody acted in a self-inrt everydone. Collectively, we . would be better off mdiVId al • . ereste way H fi u rationality, we may argue tha * owever, because S is a theory of re uted. The ab . . . t such cases do h . . . . ove criticism (be* ll . not prove t at 1t 1s dec1S1vely mg co ectively s If d fc . e e eating) also applies to what Introduction to the collection 3 is termed common-sense morality-the rea b • ha . . rall . son emg t t this form of morality 1s gene y regarded as mcluding the idea th t h . b a we ave special moral obligations towards mem ers of our family, and that fc ll * h . . . . o owmg sue obligations may bring about s1tuanons that are collectively worse th th • hi . . an ose m w ch these obligations are not followed. As highlighted by Ben Egglest * hi * d . . . . . on m s mtro uctory chapter, the discussion m Part One 1s functional to the outliru*n f h ral • f g o t e gene traits o a new moral theory that does not suffer from the above p~oblerns d h nifi • an t at u 1es consequentialism and certain aspects of common-sense morality ( Eggl , * bution for more details). see eston s contriAfter having discussed in Part One some arguments that do not seem to direct! refute S, in Part Two (Rationality and Time), Parfit proposes other arguments that ã supposed to be sufficient to reject it. This section of R&P does not question our non-reductionist intuitions about our nature and continuity over time (more on non-reductionism later) and attempts to prove that S should be rejected for reasons that are compatible with different theories of personal identity.As outlined by Brian Hedden in his contribution, in this part ofR&P Parfit offers three main arguments against S. In particular, Parfit suggests that it may be rational not to care most about one's own well-being and to care at least as much for other things, the pursuit of which we may believe is not conducive to the best possible outcome for ourselves. Examples of desires for these things include the desire to sacrifice oneself (or, at least, not to maximise our well-being) for moral reasons or desires for achievements (or, better, for some achievements in certain circurnstances) .The latter are specified in a vaguely Nietzschean fashion because Parfit includes among them the desire to produce a great work of art despite regarding the fulfilment of such a desire as not leading to what is best for oneself (within reasonable limits) . Parfit's point is that these * desires may be no less rational than the desire for what the relevant agent deems best for herself.The second line of reasoning against S is focused on one ofits alleged faulty structural features, namely, the fact that such a theory is agent-relative (in specifying the aim that is rational for an agent to pursue, the theory makes essential reference to the agent herself) but time-neutral (in considering what is best for an agent, said agent should count the well-being of each temporal part of her life equally).Against this general structure, Parfit suggests that there are reasons t~ pref~r a theory that is either fully neutral or fully relative. The thi~ argument _against S IS based on the idea that it may not be irrational to be time-biased-for instance, to care more about some future parts of our lives rather than those_parts in th~ past.As for the rest of R&P, the subtle thought experiments and ingemous reasomng used fc h * h b n highly influential and have helped to shape the to argue or t ese pomts ave ee d tails Hedden's chapter. contemporary debate--for more e , see . The third part ofR&P (Personal Identity) contains anõer rmportant and recur- . k h .d th t chano-ing our beliefs about our nature and ring theme of the boo : t e 1 ea a o* . . . s for vanous issues m moral theory persistence may have important consequence . . .fi all p rfit's achievements m this part are at least and applied ethics. More speci ic Y, a 1 full d f, nds a version of what he d Ii d force Y e e twofold* first he clearly e neates an h • f al *d u"ty) * , . . ( farnil of t eones o person 1 en will later call Constitutive Reductionism a Y 4 Andrea Sauchelli ail h ractical and moral consequences . . some det t e p "b th d cond he investigates in p Three decisively contn utes to e an ' se ' . 4 I this respect, art . . . f dopting such a view. n 1 . of personal identJ.ty 1s a necessary o a h !di of the re ation debate on whether the O ng. . (R) I this context, R can be understood h h t matters relation . n . 1£ .. h component oft e w a - . of our ratwnal se -concern. w en d *nes the extension , as the relation that etermi at t, P's well-being is part of Q's. One of Parfit s p at t1 is R-connected to Q *' h opinion of many other philosophers, . th t contrary to t e most debated theses is a ' I this paragraph, I will briefly summarise .d . • t what matters. n personal i entity is no . fi this conclusion. Parfit thinks that relation f hi I gthy reasomng or only part o . s en d f tw more fundamental relations that only partly R is exhaustively compose o o . . d h 1 . al nal *d * amely psychological contmwty an psyc o og1c compose perso i entity, n h th h Jd in the right way. 5 The amount and relevance of connectedness w en ey O • • * h 1 * al ec,.;ons between two persons at different tJ.mes, P and Q, direct psyc o ogic conn w. determine the degree of psychological connectedness between P and _Q. In several versions of the psychological view, when a strong degree of psychological connectedness is established, and chains of such connections hold between P and Q, we can say that p and Q are psychologically continuous. Examples of direct psychological connections between P at t1 and Q at tz include P's experiencing of an event at t1 an.d Q's recollection of it at tz, Q's acting at out of P's intention at t1, and so on. Crucially, given the nature of the relevant grounding relations, personal identity may be a matter of degree (this view contrasts with the theory that personal identity depends on a non-physical and non-psychological entity that is always determinate [e.g. a Cartesian Ego]). Due to the fact that personal identity includes a non-branching condition-roughly speaking, the relevant psychological relations should hold between at most two persons each at different times-and only the proper holding of the relevant psychological relations matter, personal identity is not a necessary conditi fi h . on or w at matters. In short, personal identity includes psychological connections c ti • h . . . , on nutty, t e non-branching condition and, on some versions of this criterion a condi . . hold (e.g. R h uld h ld'. . tlon regarding how these relations are supposed to s O o Ill virtue ofth * * brain). However R d contmmty of parts of the relevant person's ' oes not necessarily . 1 d h Therefore, there are cas . hi me u e t e non-branching condition. es Ill w ch personal * d * hold. Parfit argues for thi 1 . i enuty and R do not coextensively . s cone us1on by I b . previously discussed by s d Sh e a oratmg on a thought experiment th y ney oemak:er and D "d w* . ere are cases of SYffimetr* fi . avi 1ggms. The upshot is that h l . ic issions-cases i hi h . . . c O ogical connections existi n w c an mdiv1dual's relevant psyp h ng at t1 are equall di .b ersons eac existing at a later ti y stn uted between two different to regard as b * me tz-the outcom f hi h . h emg as bad as death I hi es O w c It may be irrational t e conse * n t s pan of R&P p _quences of adopting a red . . . , arfit also elaborates on persona] identity d Ii uct1onist view (th • e neated above is e psychological account of Ill moral theory F one lOrm of red * . weight d . or example, he explores th "d uctiorusm) for other issues an scope to * e 1 ea that • to the de f certain principles of dist "b . we may assign a different gree o psych 1 . n ution (e ali my introduct h o ogica] connectedness h ldi . .g. equ ty) proportionally ory c apter for more details. o ng mtraor inter-personally. See Introduction to the collection 5 Future Generations, the fourth part of R&P, begins with the claim that it is of utmost importance th~t a moral t~eory should address how we ought to behave towards futu~e genei:aoõs. In partJ.cular, an acceptable unified moral theory {perhaps of the kind outlined m Part One) should solve a series of puzzles and problems addressing, among other things, harm and beneficence towards future people. Some of these problems partly derive from the fact that our present choices affect not only the number and quality of life of future people but also their identity. For instance, the famous non-identity problem stems from an attempt to reconcile apparently plausible principles, some of which involve the existence of future people. In particular, some philosophers claim that an act can be wrong only if it makes things worse for some existing or future people (bad must be bad for someone), and that an act is not bad for someone if the act brings about the existence of such a person, provided that the life of this person is at least worth living ( or, at least, existence-conferring acts, acts unavoidable for the existence of an individual, do not make the existence they bring about worse) . Now, Parfit puts forward some cases involving actions that we would intuitively judge to be wrong but that are simultaneously unavoidable for generating lives that are at least worth living. For example, take the case of a 14-year-old girl who decides to have a child and whose socioeconomic situation clearly suggests that she is unable to provide her child with a good start in life. Had she waited for several more years, she would have been able to give a better start in life to the other child she would have had. The life of the child she gives birth to is worth living but significantly worse than the life she could have given to the other child she would have had if she had waited several more years. Many people agree that the girl should have waited but can we say that, by not waiting, she has thereby harmed her actual child? How can we explain our initial intuition that the girl should have waited? According to Parfit, a satisfying moral theory should solve this problem and meet other requirements. These requirements include: (1) Avoiding the Repugnant conclusion-roughly speaking, the conclusion that it is better to have a large population of people whose lives are barely worth living than a population of significantly fewer people but with a much higher quality of life; (2) Avoiding the Absurd conclusion--consider two scenarios: in the first, there is a huge population at t1 with a quality of life higher than our planet now in which one person in 10 billion has a life of uncompensated suffering, whereas in the second scenario, there is a collection of populations of 10 billion each (as before, one person in 10 billion has a miserable life) that do not interact with each other (e.g. each group of 10 billion of these people lives at times after t1). If we impose a local limit on the value of positive quantity but not on negative quantity (for example, if we believe that there is a limit to the positive value that an increase in quantity can have at a specific time but also think that the disvalue of an increase in uncompensated suffering has no upper limit), then the first scenario is bad (because the quantity of suffering is not outweighed by the increase of quantity of positiv~ value), wher~as the second scenario is good (because the increase of quality outweighs the quantity of uncompensated suffering). However, this asymmetrical e~uation is abs~rd.Afi:er a painstaking discussion of these problems and possible solutions, Parfit claims that, 6 Andrea Sauchelli . fi all these requirements. See Roberts's h ry that saus 1es . •n R&P. he has found not eo . . fthese and related issues. i ' c. itical discuss10n o . Chapter on Part Four 1or a er rfi 1 cts this general pomt as a common . fR&P. Pa 1t se e In one of the final secuons O . b' k* , u reasons for acting should be more b l tfromhisoo.or * * theme or lesson to e earn d . th bri* ef introduction above, this idea has * *an merge Ill e impersonal'.As 1t has paru Ye the a lication of his reductionism in personal taken different forms-for ~x~ple: fpp rson-affecting principles to solve the . rali d his reJecuon o pe . identity to mo ty, an h f Parfit's career can be seen as an mcreas-. bl In a way, t e rest o non-identity pro em. ti ' ther theoretical level) to further refine and ingly enriched attempt. (mos y at a _ra P. im rove on the conclusions reached m R& . . . p fthi 11 t'on comprises new ongmal papers on some of the The second part o s co ec 1 . . . . 6 * I ChrisoulaAndreou's chapter discusses some theoretical ideas m R&P. In partlcu ar, . . f Parfit, quandaries (and later elaborauons by other philosophers) consequences o s . 1 d bl ms i*n value theory. In particular,Andreou considers the tran-on puzz es an pro e , . sitivity of the "better than" relation, using Parfit s w~r~ _on the Repugnant Conclusion as her starting point. Andreou considers the possibility of betterness cycles and the implications of accepting the intransitivity of "better than." She argues that if betterness cycles are indeed possible, then a distinctive form of satisficing that involves reasoning in terms ofleagues, plays a crucial role in proper reasoning about what to do. David Braddon-Mitchell and Kristie Miller's contribution outlines the conceptual terrain of what they call conative accounts of personal identity. These views have in common the idea that personal identity over time depends on conative phenomena such as desires, behaviours and conventions. In particular, the authors distinguish tliese conative views along three dimensions, namely, on the basis of (1) what role the conations play, (2) what kinds of conations play that role and (3) whether the conations that play that role are public or private. Braddon-Mitchell añ Miller also evaluate such theories by adopting two key desiderata: accommodatmg faultless disagreement d da . . . . an accommo tmg our practICal concerns. Christian Coseru addre th fi 11 • . sses e o owmg questions: What justifies holding the person that we are today rall . F h . . mo Y responsible for something we did a year ago? urt er, why are we Justified * h . . of the ill m s owing prudential concern for the future welfare person we w be a yea & ? cannot be systemat* all r om now. Coseru suggests that these questions Ic Y pursued with t dd * tity. His chapter con *d h h ou a ressmg the problem of personal iden-s1 ers w et er Buddhi R d . . grounded in the idea that st e uctiorusm, a philosophical project . persons can be red d . tual, dispositional and cons . 1 uce to a set of bodily, sensory, percep-c1ous e ements p • d criterion for personal identity C ' rov_1 es support for Parfit's psychological l . • oseru exanun h 1 P ays m mediating both s If. es t e ro e that self-consciousness fi . e -concern and con fc . or how reductionism about b . cern or others, offering an argument h . . su stantive or end . I . t e seemingly irreducible ch unng se ves may be reconciled with . . aracter of self. . Nilaruan Das and LA p 1 . . -consciousness. of . . au Investigate some hil . acts, namely, those acts that ch h P osophical aspects of a subclass A personally transforrnative act is oangehwbo_ we _are (personally traniformative acts). net at rings . Into eXIstence a future self that is Introduction to the collection 7 radically different from who th . b e agent previously was. In some of these cases the agent may e antecedently tai h h . ' h h . . cer n t at t e eXIstence of this future self although wort avmg will be u 'dabl fl . ' ' . navoi Y awed, even if the future self values its existence. Howeve_r, if the agent does not perform the transformative act, she will not change so radically, so her unchanged future self may indeed be better off than her tr:ansfõed future self. In their chapter, Das and Paul argue that situations of this kmd rai~e a pro?le°:1 that is structurally similar to the non-identity problem. In ~s c?ntnbut1on to this collection, Dale Dorsey unravels some important t~eoret1cal issues related to the Self-interest theory (or prudence). In particular, he ?1scusses a problem associated with the idea that, although the Self-interest theory 1s not the whole story about practical rationality, many philosophers find it entirely plausible to hold that prudence is the best theory of rationality when it comes to normative self-concern, the idea being that, when our decision concerns only us, we have the strongest reason to promote our welfare to the greatest extent. However, prudence can seem alienating, especially in cases in which we are called upon to abandon deeply valued projects for the sake of projects we may have already taken on (or have yet to take on)-and yet, prudence seems precisely correct in cases of other, less significant welfare goods. Dorsey argues that this puzzle can be solved by holding that self-concern is not prudential. In particular, he claims that self-concern is not (or need not be) welfarist in nature. Carol Rovane focuses her attention on Christine Korsgaard's early critical response to Parfit's Reasons and Persons, in which Korsgaard pointed out that Parfit's reductionist account of personal identity did not take due account of the fact that persons are agents. In her contribution, Rovane offers a reductionist account of personal agency that takes this into account. In particular, Rovane's reductionism holds that the existence of a person consists in nothing but a certain sort of intentional activity that stands in the right sorts of relations. The account also claims that persons are self-constituting in much the way that Korsgaard suggests. Rovane's form of reductionism, however, does not support Korsgaard's Kantian ambition to derive and ground an unconditional imperative of morality. Nor does it support the Kantian conception of the person of an end in itself, for it entails that persons, qua agents, exist for the sake of the ends that their existence makes it possible to pursue--the ends for the sake of which they constitute themselves. Rovane's account agrees with Parfit's claim that we must revise our common_-se~se notions about the moral significance of the individual person.Yet it ~oes_ ñt mVIte the consequentialist orientation that Parfit thought his own reducnon mv1~ed. . The last chapter of the collection, David Velleman's 'Non-idenucal and imper- . * hro h h 1 of a broadly Kantian approach sonal', discusses several topics t ug t e ens . . to ethics. In particular, Velleman offers a solution to the non-idennty p~bl~m * * . h reiecting some of the utilitarian that resorts to the Categoncal Imperative, t us . . d h d b t O far Velleman claims that rather assumptions that have characterise t e e a e s * . . f h d benefit towards parncular people, we than focusing on the notions o arm an . d " 11 , nh d * Jf an be disrespecte . ve eman s should consider the idea that perso 00 itse c . . . th t . . . rfi , h on what matters-a cnnc1sm a chapter also contains a cnt1C1sm of Pa its t eses 8 Andrea Sauchelli Velleman advances from the perspective of his imaginability-based account of what matters and personal identity. Notes 1 In particular, Parfit (1984/87: x). . . 2 Even a lengthier summary of the book would be inadequate for c~pturmg ~e richness of R&P.The brief introduction in the main text will sidestep many important ISSues and be imprecise in certain important aspects. 3 Parfit discusses in Appendix I, thoroughly analysed in Chris Heathwood's contribution, various different theories of well-being or welfare. 4 See Parfit (1999) . 5 A more precise formulation of relation R is given in a later essay, that is, Parfit (2007). 6 With the exception of the short introduction rn Velleman's chapter, the descriptions of the chapters m Part II m the mam text are abndged versions of the abstracts sent b the authors. y References Parfit, D. 1984/87. Reasom and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Parfit, D. 1999. Experiences, Subjects, and Conceptual Schemes. Philosophical Topics 26, 1-2: 217-270. Parfit, D. 2007. Is Personal Identity What Matters? Marc Sanders Foundation, 31 December. Retrieved at: www.mucsandersfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/paper-Derek-Parfit. pdf Additional resources Dmcy. J oi 1997 . ..,_,,,. P.!/i,. Ou°"' Wiley. d R&e 13⁄4di<'s replie, ,re A mi.n. of""°""" oitic,t - ,_fic,lly fuo,re ~• ublished onlin, (e.g., not collected in the same volume, and some have only een p 1'rli'2<l07J. d 26 Jun, 20 19 -Macfarquhar, L. 2011. How To Be Good. New Yorker, 29 August. Accesse WWw.newyorker.comtrnagazine/2011 /09 /05/how-to-be-good An in•-• t>n>fi1o du, mdudo doo P.rli<'s life. . 9 Mi,_,,W 2016 °"" 1'rlie, Con•ibw;,,m <o Pbilosopby. Th,on, 82, 104--t O * A "'"''md heJpfi,i '""""-Y of R&p and of son,e of P,cfi~ o<h« ,dri,..,meno. Syo,prui,,, °" D~k 1'rlit', R,-om ,nd Penom, E•iu 96, 4. . . P,m, modifi,d <he 1987 <Wtioo ofR&p also in ligh, of""" of <h, conun,no ,nd «ioc.= contained in this special editi n of Ethics. Willi,m,, B. 1984. P<noo,t I"""" /.,,J., R,,,;~ of &ok 6, 1 O, 14--15. Bernard Williams' review ofR&P. Pariit~ pub/katJons prior and ref,.ant to Reasons and Persons 1'rli, D. 1971. P,,so,,t ldooti<y. Pl,if"'"J',ioI R,,,;~ 8Q, t :,._ 27 _ 1'rli, D. !97'. On 11,, ln,po,of SeJr_ldonti<y' .J,..,,,I ef l3⁄4iio«,phy 68, 20, 683--<i90. Introduction to the collection 9 Parfit, D. 1973. Later Selves and Moral Principles. In A. Montefiore, ed., Philosophy and Personal Relations, 137-169. Routledge. Parfit, D. 1976a. Lewis, Perry, and What Matters. In A. Rorty, ed., The Identities of Persons, 91-107. University of California Press. Parfit, D. 1976b. Rights, Interests, and Possible People. In S. Gorovitz et al., eds., Moral Problems in Medicine, 369-375. Prentice-Hall. Parfit, D. 1976c. On Doing the Best for Our Children. In M. D. Bayles, ed., Ethics and Population, 100-115. Schenkman Pub. Co. Parfit, D. 1978. Innumerate Ethics. Philosophy and Public Affairs 7, 4: 285-301. Parfit, D. 1979a. Is Common-Sense Morality Self-Defeating? Journal of Philosophy 76, 10: 533-545. Parfit, D . 1979b. Prudence, Morality, and the Prisoner's Dilemma. Proceedings of the British Academy 65: 539-564. Parfit, D. 1980. An Attack on the Social Discount Rate. Philosophy & Public Policy Quarterly 1,1: 8-11. Parfit, D. 1982a. Personal Identity and Rationality. Synthese 53: 227-241. Parfit, D. 1982b. Future Generations: Further Problems. Philosophy and Public Affairs 11, 2. Parfit, D. 1983a. Energy Policy and the Further Future: The Social Discount Rate. In D. MacLean & P. G. Brown, eds., Energy and the Future, 31-37. Rowman and Littlefield. Parfit, D. 1983b. Energy Policy and the Further Future: The Identity Problem. In D. MacLean & P. G. Brown, eds., Energy and the Future, 166-179. Rowman and Littlefield. Parfit, D. 1984. Rationality and Time. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 84, 1: 47-82.